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Abstract. The growing expanse of e-commerce and the widespread
availability of online databases raise many fears regarding loss of pri-
vacy and many statistical challenges. Even with encryption and other
nominal forms of protection for individual databases, we still need to
protect against the violation of privacy through linkages across mul-
tiple databases. These issues parallel those that have arisen and re-
ceived some attention in the context of homeland security. Following
the events of September 11, 2001, there has been heightened attention
in the United States and elsewhere to the use of multiple government
and private databases for the identification of possible perpetrators of
future attacks, as well as an unprecedented expansion of federal gov-
ernment data mining activities, many involving databases containing
personal information. We present an overview of some proposals that
have surfaced for the search of multiple databases which supposedly do
not compromise possible pledges of confidentiality to the individuals
whose data are included. We also explore their link to the related lit-
erature on privacy-preserving data mining. In particular, we focus on
the matching problem across databases and the concept of “selective
revelation” and their confidentiality implications.
Key words and phrases: Encryption, multiparty computation, privacy-
preserving data mining, record linkage, R–U confidentiality map, selec-
tive revelation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Click on Google and search for “Feinberg contingency talb” and you will be
asked if you meant “feinberg contingency table,” and if you click on this again
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you will reach a mix of links to publications that refer to “Bishop, Fienberg and
Holland” [3] or “Bishop, Feinberg and Holland,” or other papers by the present
author with his name spelled “Feinberg,” “Fienberg” and many other ways! All
thanks to the data mining tool of hidden Markov models and Google’s page-
rank methodology. This represents data mining at work in e-commerce, but in
situations that do not violate my privacy or impinge on promises of confiden-
tiality. Indeed, most authors in statistics are happy to have their name appear
in a Google search whether it is spelled correctly or incorrectly. Data mining
tools help enable searches as we engage in e-commerce, whether it is in a form
like collaborative filtering or something more elaborate. When the data used by
individual e-commerce vendors are linked to other databases, however, issues of
privacy and confidentiality become front and center [29]. This has become of spe-
cial concern in recent months as the U.S. government has attempted to secure
individually identified information from Google and other companies engaged in
e-commerce. (Katie Hafner and Matt Richtel, “Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of
Search Data,” The New York Times, January 20, 2006.)
The website of the American Civil Liberties Union includes a “flash movie”
of a telephone pizza order (www.aclu.org/pizza/) that triggers a series of data
retrievals from some gigantic integrated database that includes medical records,
travel information, magazine subscriptions, clothing purchases and seemingly in-
stantaneously linked local area crime reports. It represents the public’s worst fears
regarding the invasion of privacy that has come from e-commerce and growth and
spread of data warehousing. The website warns that “Government programs such
as MATRIX and Carnivore are destroying our privacy. We live in a democratic
society and government-controlled data systems are a dangerous step toward es-
tablishing a 24-hour surveillance society.” What are these programs? Is the pizza
movie myth or reality?
Here are some related stories in the news this past year:
• “Identity thieves posing as legitimate businesses were able to access profiles
that include Social Security numbers, credit histories, criminal records and
other sensitive material, ChoicePoint spokesman Chuck Jones said. [Choice-
Point] maintains personal profiles of nearly every U.S. consumer, which it sells
to employers, landlords, marketing companies and about 35 U.S. government
agencies. In California, the only state that requires companies to disclose secu-
rity breaches, ChoicePoint sent warning letters to 30,000 to 35,000 consumers
advising them to check their credit reports.” Excerpted from “Thieves Steal
Consumer Info Database,” CNN Money, February 15, 2005.
• “Billions of records about virtually every adult in the country are maintained
by an array of companies. Among the most familiar are the credit bureaus
that have long tracked debts and payment histories. Less familiar, though, are
data brokers such as ChoicePoint, which aggregate other personal information
and operate with fewer restrictions. And, increasingly, banks and credit card
companies maintain considerable data caches on their customers.” Excerpted
from “Firms Hit by ID Theft Find Way to Cash In on Victims,” Los Angeles
Times, August 22, 2005.
• “LexisNexis, a worldwide provider of legal and business data, announced yes-
terday that information about 32,000 consumers was fraudulently gathered
in a series of incidents. The data include names, addresses and Social Secu-
rity and driver’s license numbers.” Excerpted from Jonathan Krim and Robert
O’Harrow Jr., “Data Under Siege,” The Washington Post, Thursday, March 10,
2005 (www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19982-2005Mar9.html).
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“Reed Elsevier, owner of the LexisNexis data bases, said Tuesday that Social
Security numbers, driver’s license information and the addresses of 310,000
people may have been stolen, 10 times more than it originally reported last
month.” Excerpted from “Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger,”
by Heather Timmons, The New York Times, April 13, 2005.
• “. . . 41 graduate students in a computer security course at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. . . became mini-data-brokers themselves over the last semester. . . .Working
with a strict requirement to use only legal, public sources of information, groups
of three to four students set out to vacuum up not just tidbits on citizens of
Baltimore, but whole databases: death records, property tax information, cam-
paign donations, occupational license registries. They then cleaned and linked
the databases they had collected, making it possible to enter a single name
and generate multiple layers of information on individuals. Each group could
spend no more than $50. . . . Several groups managed to gather well over a
million records, with hundreds of thousands of individuals represented in each
database.” Excerpted from “Personal Data for the Taking,” by Tom Zeller Jr.,
The New York Times, May 18, 2005.
• “In one of the largest breaches of data security to date, CitiFinancial, the
consumer finance subsidiary of Citigroup, announced yesterday that a box of
computer tapes containing information on 3.9 million customers was lost by
United Parcel Service last month, while in transit to a credit reporting agency.”
Excerpted from “Personal Data for 3.9 Million Lost in Transit,” by Tom Zeller
Jr., The New York Times, June 7, 2005.
Data warehousing companies such as Acxiom, ChoicePoint and LexisNexis
use their data to perform background checks on prospective applicants to em-
ployers, insurers and credit providers. They also sell their data to state and
federal governments. Figure 1 shows the array of data available from Choice-
Point and the types of clients who access, as presented by The Washington Post
(www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/daily/graphics/choicepoint_012005.html).
If you go to the ChoicePoint website (www.choicepoint.com) and read the pri-
vacy policy you are told about “How we protect you,” but if you want to check
the accuracy of information on yourself that ChoicePoint sells to others you need
to provide your Social Security number! This means that if ChoicePoint did not
have your Social Security number before, it would now, and they make no promise
about how it will (or will not) be used or shared in the future.
In part as a consequence of the data security breaches of the sort described
above, some form of data breach legislation has been introduced in at least 35
states and signed into law in at least 22, according to data compiled by the
National Conference of State Legislatures. (Tom Zeller Jr. “Link by link; Waking
up to recurring ID nightmares,” The New York Times, January 9, 2006.)
In the next section we briefly describe a related set of government data mining
and data warehousing activities that came into the public eye following the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The link with the more public e-commerce
activities was MATRIX, referred to by the ACLU webpage but which has since
been “publicly” abandoned. In Section 3 we give an overview of record linkage
and its use for merging large data files from diverse sources as well as its im-
plications for the splitting of databases for privacy protection. Section 4 reviews
some proposals that have surfaced for the search of multiple databases without
compromising possible pledges of confidentiality to the individuals whose data
are included and their link to the related literature on privacy-preserving data
4 S. E. FIENBERG
Fig. 1. ChoicePoint data sources and clients. Source: The Washington Post, January 20, 2005.
mining. In particular, we focus on the concept of selective revelation and its confi-
dentiality implications. We relate these ideas to the recent statistical literature on
disclosure limitation for confidential databases and explain the problems with the
privacy claims. We conclude with some observations regarding privacy protection
and e-commerce.
2. HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR TERRORISTS
A recently issued report from the U.S. General Accounting Office [37] notes
that at least 52 agencies are using or planning to use data mining, “factual data
analysis,” or “predictive analytics,” in some 199 different efforts. Of these, at
least 29 projects involve analyzing intelligence and detecting terrorist activities,
or detecting criminal activities or patterns. Notable among the nonresponders
to the GAO inquiry were agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency (NSA).
Perhaps the most visible of these efforts was the Total Information Awareness
(TIA) program initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Program (DARPA)
in DARPA’s Information Awareness Office (IAO), which was established in Jan-
uary 2002, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The TIA
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research and development program was aimed at integrating information tech-
nologies into a prototype to provide tools to better detect, classify and identify
potential foreign terrorists. When it came under public scrutiny in 2003, TIA mor-
phed into the Terrorist Information Program (still TIA) with essentially the same
objectives, although it too did not move forward into implementation. TIA served
as the model, however, for the Multi-state Anti-terrorism Information Exchange
system (MATRIX) that was in use in seven states for a period of time during
2004 and 2005, and was intended to provide “the capability to store, analyze, and
exchange sensitive terrorism-related information in MATRIX data bases among
agencies, within a state, among states, and between state and federal agencies.”
According to a recent report from the Congressional Research Service [30] [foot-
notes omitted]:
The MATRIX project was initially developed in the days following
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by Seisint, a Florida-based
information products company, in an effort to facilitate collaborative
information sharing and factual data analysis. At the outset of the
project, MATRIX included a component Seisint called the High Ter-
rorist Factor (HTF), which was designed to identify individuals with
high HTF scores, or so-called terrorism quotients, based on an analysis
of demographic and behavioral data. Although the HTF scoring system
appeared to attract the interest of officials, this feature was reportedly
dropped from MATRIX because it relied on intelligence data not nor-
mally available to the law enforcement community and because of con-
cerns about privacy abuses.
. . . The analytical core of the MATRIX pilot project is an application
called Factual Analysis Criminal Threat Solution (FACTS), described
as a “technological, investigative tool allowing query-based searches of
available state and public records in the data reference repository.” The
FACTS application allows an authorized user to search “dynamically”
combined records from disparate datasets based on partial informa-
tion, and will “assemble” the results. The data reference repository
used with FACTS represents the amalgamation of over 3.9 billion pub-
lic records collected from thousands of sources. The data contained
in FACTS include FAA pilot license and aircraft ownership records,
property ownership records, information on vessels registered with the
Coast Guard, state sexual offender lists, federal terrorist watch lists,
corporation filings, Uniform Commercial Code filings, bankruptcy fil-
ings, state-issued professional license records, criminal history informa-
tion, department of corrections information and photo images, driver’s
license information and photo images, motor vehicle registration infor-
mation, and information from commercial sources that “are generally
available to the public or legally permissible under federal law.”
. . . To help address the privacy concerns associated with a centralized
data repository, some officials have suggested switching to a distributed
approach whereby each state would maintain possession of its data and
control access according to its individual laws.
The data reference repository is said to exclude data from the following sources:
• telemarketing call lists,
• direct mail mailing lists,
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• airline reservations or travel records,
• frequent flyer/hotel stay program membership information or activity,
• magazine subscription records,
• information about purchases made at retailers or over the Internet,
• telephone calling logs or records,
• credit or debit card numbers,
• mortgage or car payment information,
• bank account numbers or balance information,
• records of birth certificates, marriage licenses and divorce decrees, and
• utility bill payment information.
Nonetheless, MATRIX and its data records sound suspiciously like the ACLU
Pizza Movie scenario! And the links to the news stories excerpted in Section 1
are more direct than one might imagine. In 2004, LexisNexis acquired Seisint and
the security breaches were in the new Seisint subsidiary, the very same one that
provides the data for MATRIX!
MATRIX was officially abandoned as a multistate activity in April 2005 al-
though individual states were allowed to continue with their parts of the pro-
gram. This does not mean the demise of the TIA effort, however, as there are
other federal initiatives built on a similar model:
• Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight and Semantic Enhancement
(ADVISE), which is a research and development program within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), part of its three-year-old “Threat
and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment” portfolio (Mark Clayton, “US
Plans Massive Data Sweep,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2006.
www.csmonitor.com/2006/0209/p01s02-uspo.html).
• The Information Awareness Prototype System (IAPS), the core architecture
that tied together numerous information extraction, analysis and dissemina-
tion tools developed under TIA, including the privacy-protection technologies,
was moved to the Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA),
housed at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md (Shane Harris, “TIA Lives
On,” National Journal, Thursday, Feb. 23, 2006).
In TIA, MATRIX, ADVISE and IAPS, the data miner can issue queries to the
multiple linked databases and receive responses that combine data on individuals
across the databases. The goal is the identification of terrorists or criminals in
a way that would not be possible from the individual databases. We distinguish
between two aspects of this goal: (1) identification of known terrorists which is a
form of retro- or postdiction, and (2) identification of potential future terrorists
and profiling, which involves prediction. Prediction cannot be separated from un-
certainty; postdiction might conceivably be. Most of the public outcry regarding
TIA and MATRIX has focused on concerns regarding what has been described
as “dataveillance” [4] and terrorist profiling, that is, concerns both about the use
of data for purposes other than those for which they were collected without the
consent of the individual, and about the quality and accuracy of the mined data
and the likelihood that they may help falsely identify individuals as terrorists.
In the next two sections, we explore some issues related to the creation and the
use of “linked” databases for the privacy of the individuals whose confidential
information is contained in them.
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3. MATCHING AND RECORD LINKAGE METHODS
More than 100 vendors offer record matching systems, some of which sell for
thousands of dollars, but most of the underlying methodology for such systems is
proprietary and few details are publicly available. Matches can occur at random.
For example, consider a pair of files, A and B, containing n records on the same
individuals. Then the probability of correctly matching exactly r individuals by
picking a random permutation for file B and linking to file A is
∑n−r
ν=0((−1)
n − r)/ν!
r!
.(1)
Domingo-Ferrer and Torra [8] derive this baseline and illustrate it numerically
in an example with n = 90, where the expected number of correct matches is
O(1024). Working with actual data in the matching process can change this sit-
uation drastically.
Bilenko et al. [2] provide an overview of the published literature on the topic
noting that most methods rely on the existence of unique identifiers or use some
variation of the algorithm presented in Fellegi and Sunter [14]. Fellegi and Sunter’s
approach is built on several key components for identifying matching pairs of
records across two files:
• Represent every pair of records using a vector of features (variables) that de-
scribe similarity between individual record fields. Features can be Boolean (e.g.,
last-namematches), discrete (e.g., first-n-characters-of-name-agree) or contin-
uous (e.g., string-edit-distance-between-first-names).
• Place feature vectors for record pairs into three classes: matches (M ), non-
matches (U ) and possible matches. These correspond to “equivalent,” “nonequiv-
alent” and possibly equivalent (e.g., requiring human review) record pairs, re-
spectively.
• Perform record-pair classification by calculating the ratio (P (γ |M))/(P (γ |
U)) for each candidate record pair, where γ is a feature vector for the pair and
P (γ |M) and P (γ | U) are the probabilities of observing that feature vector for
a matched and nonmatched pair, respectively. Two thresholds based on desired
error levels—Tµ and Tλ—optimally separate the ratio values for equivalent,
possibly equivalent and nonequivalent record pairs.
• When no training data in the form of duplicate and nonduplicate record pairs
is available, matching can be unsupervised, where conditional probabilities for
feature values are estimated using observed frequencies.
• Because most record pairs are clearly nonmatches, we need not consider them
for matching. The way to manage this is to “block” the databases, for ex-
ample, based on geography or some other variable in both databases, so that
only records in comparable blocks are compared. Such a strategy significantly
improves efficiency.
The first four components lay the groundwork for accuracy of record-pair
matching using statistical techniques such as logistic regression, the EM algo-
rithm and Bayes networks (e.g., see [22, 25, 38]). Accuracy is well known to be
high when there is a 1–1 match between records in the two systems and dete-
riorates as the overlap between the files decreases as well as with the extent of
measurement error in the feature values. While the use of human review of pos-
sible matches has been an integral part of many statistical applications, it may
well be infeasible for large-scale data warehousing. The fifth component provides
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for efficiently processing large databases, but to the extent that blocking is ap-
proximate and possibly inaccurate its use decreases the accuracy of record-pair
matching.
There are three potential lessons associated with this literature on matching
and the methods it has produced:
1. If we are trying to protect against an intruder who would like to merge the
data in a confidential database with an external database in his/her posses-
sion, then we need to assure ourselves and the intruder that the accuracy of
matching is low and that individuals cannot be identified with high probabil-
ity. We need to keep in mind that an intruder will have easy access to a host
of identifiable public record systems. For example, as of September 7, 2005,
SearchSystems.net (www.searchsystems.net/) listed 34,035 free searchable
public record databases on its website!
2. One strategy for protecting a database against attack from an intruder is to
split it into parts, perhaps overlapping, to decrease the likelihood of accurate
matches. The parts should be immune from attack (with high probability) but
of value for analytical purposes. For categorical data this might correspond
to reporting lower-dimensional margins from a high-dimensional contingency
table; see [5, 6] and [18]. For continuous data we might need to apply disclosure
protection methods to the split components; for example, see [9] and [15]
for overviews. It is the uncertainty associated with efforts to concatenate the
separate pieces that provides the confidentiality protection in both instances.
The higher the uncertainty the better the protection.
3. Unless ChoicePoint and other data warehousers are adding data into their
files using unique identifiers such as Social Security numbers (and even Social
Security numbers are not really unique!), or with highly accurate addresses
and/or geography, some reasonable fraction of the data in their files will be
the result of inaccurate and faulty matches. Data quality for data warehouses
is an issue we all need to worry about; see [39].
4. ENCRYPTION, MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION AND
PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MINING
If you search the WWW for “e-commerce” and “data privacy protection” you
will find extensive discussion about firewalls, intrusion prevention (IPS) and intru-
sion detection (IDS) systems, and secure socket layer (SSL) encryption technol-
ogy. Indeed, these technological tools are important for secure data transmission,
statistical production and offline data storage; see [7]. But encryption cannot
protect the privacy of individuals whose data are available in online databases!
Among the methods advocated to carry out such data mining exercises are
those that are described as privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM). PPDM typ-
ically refers to data mining computations performed on the combined data sets
of multiple parties without revealing each party’s data to the other parties. The
data consist of possibly overlapping sets of variables contained in the separate
databases of the parties and overlapping sets of individuals. When the parties
have data for the same variables but different individuals the data are said to
be horizontally partitioned, whereas when the individuals are the same but the
variables are different the data are said to be vertically partitioned. Here we are
concerned with the more complex case involving both overlapping variables and
overlapping sets of individuals. PPDM research comes in two varieties. In the
first, sometimes referred to as the construction of “privacy-preserving statistical
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databases,” the data are altered prior to delivery for data mining, for example,
through the addition of random noise or some other form of perturbation. While
these approaches share much in common with the methods in the literature on
statistical disclosure limitation, they are of little use when it comes to the iden-
tification of terrorists. In the second variety, the problem is solved using what
is known as “multiparty secure computation,” where no party knows anything
except its own input and the results. The literature typically presumes that data
are included without error and thus could be matched perfectly if only there
were no privacy concerns. The methods also focus largely on situations where the
results are of some computation, such as a dot product or the description of an
association rule. See the related discussion in [19].
A major problem with the PPDM literature involving multiparty computation
is that the so-called proofs of security are designed to protect not the individuals
in the database but rather the database owners, as in the case of two companies
sharing information but not wanting to reveal information about their customers
to one another beyond that contained in the shared computation. Once the results
of the data mining consist of linked extracts of the data themselves, however, the
real question is whether one of the parties can use the extra information to infer
something about the individuals in the other party’s data that would otherwise
not be available.
Secure computation is a technique for carrying out computations across multi-
ple databases without revealing any information about data elements found only
in one database. The technique consists of a protocol for exchanging messages.
We assume the parties to be semihonest: that is, they correctly follow the pro-
tocol specification, yet attempt to learn additional information by analyzing the
messages that are passed. For example, Agrawal, Evfimievski and Srikant [1] il-
lustrate the secure computation notion via an approach to the matching problem
for parties A and B. They introduce a pair of encryption functions E (known only
to A) and E′ (known only to B) such that for all x, E(E′(x)) = E′(E(x)). A’s
database consists of a list A and B’s consists of a list B. A sends B the message
E(A); B computes E′(E(A)) and then sends to A the two messages E′(E(A))
and E′(B). A then applies E to E′(B), yielding E′(E(A)) and E′(E(B)). A com-
putes E′(E(A))∩E′(E(B)). Since A knows the order of items in A, A also knows
the order of items in E′E(A)) and can quickly determine A∩B. The main prob-
lems with this approach are (1) it is asymmetric, that is, B must trust A to send
A∩B back, and (2) it presumes semihonest behavior.
Li, Tygar and Hellerstein in [26] describe a variety of scenarios in which the
Agrawal et al. protocol can easily be exploited by one party to obtain a great
deal of information about the other’s database, and they explain drawbacks of
some other secure computation methods including the use of one-way hash-based
schemes. As Dwork and Nissim [13] note: “There is also a very large literature
in secure multi-party computation. In secure multi-party computation, function-
ality is paramount, and privacy is only preserved to the extent that the func-
tion outcome itself does not reveal information about the individual inputs. In
privacy-preserving statistical data bases, privacy is paramount.” The problem
with privacy-preserving datamining methods for terrorist detection is that they
seek the protection of the latter while revealing individual records using the func-
tionality of the former. For more details on some of these and other issues, see
[23].
The U.S. Congress and various private foundations have taken up the issue
of privacy protection from government data mining activities especially in the
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Fig. 2. R–U confidentiality maps for two different disclosure limitation methods with varying
parameter settings. Adapted from [12].
post-9/11 world. For example, in its recent report, the U.S. Department of De-
fense Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC) [36] has stressed the
existence of a broad array of government data mining programs, and disjointed,
inconsistent and outdated laws and regulations protecting privacy. TAPAC rec-
ommended broad new actions to protect privacy, both within the Department of
Defense and across agencies of the federal government.
The long-standing concern regarding surveillance of U.S. citizens and others
by government agencies has been heightened during the war on terror (e.g., see
[24]) and especially most recently with the controversy over unauthorized do-
mestic spying. (David Johnston and Neil A. Lewis, “Domestic Surveillance: The
White House; Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law,” The New
York Times, December 23, 2005.)
5. SELECTIVE REVELATION, THE RISK-UTILITY TRADE-OFF AND
DISCLOSURE LIMITATION ASSESSMENT
To get around the privacy problems associated with the development of the
TIA and MATRIX systems Tygar [34, 35] and others have advocated the use
of what has come to be called “selective revelation,” involving something like
the risk-utility trade-off in statistical disclosure limitation. Sweeney [33] used
the term to describe an approach to disclosure limitation that allows data to be
shared for surveillance purposes “with a sliding scale of identifiability, where the
level of anonymity matches scientific and evidentiary need.” This corresponds
to a monotonically increasing threshold for maximum tolerable risk in the R–U
confidentiality map framework described in [10, 11, 12], as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 3 depicts the basic selective revelation scheme as described in a com-
mittee report on TIA privacy methodology [21].
The TIA privacy report [21] suggests that
Selective revelation works by putting a security barrier between the
private data and the analyst, and controlling what information can
flow across that barrier to the analyst. The analyst injects a query that
uses the private data to determine a result, which is a high-level san-
itized description of the query result. That result must not leak any
private information to the analyst. Selective revelation must accom-
modate multiple data sources, all of which lie behind the (conceptual)
security barrier. Private information is not made available directly to
the analyst, but only through the security barrier.
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Fig. 3. Idealized selective revelation architecture. Adapted from Slide 11, [21].
One effort to implement this scheme was dubbed privacy appliances by Lunt [27]
and it was intended to be a stand-alone device that would sit between the analyst
and the private data source so that private data stays in authorized hands. These
privacy controls would also be independently operated to keep them isolated from
the government. According to Lunt [27] the device would provide:
• Inference control to prevent unauthorized individuals from completing queries
that would allow identification of ordinary citizens.
• Access control to return sensitive identifying data only to authorized users.
• Immutable audit trail for accountability.
Implicit in the TIA Report and in the Lunt approach was the notion that link-
ages across databases behind the security barrier would utilize identifiable records
and thus some form of multiparty computation method involving encryption tech-
niques.
The real questions of interest in “inference control” are: (1) What disclosure
limitation methods should be used? (2) To which databases should they be ap-
plied? and (3) How can the “inference control” approaches be combined with the
multiparty computation methods? Here is what we know in the way of answers:
1. Both Sweeney [33] and Lunt et al. [28] refer to Sweeney’s version of micro-
aggregation, known as k-anonymity, but with few details on how it could be
used in this context. This methodology combines observations in groups of size
k and reports either the sum or the average of the group for each unit. The
groups may be identified by clustering or some other statistical approach. Left
unsaid is what kinds of analyses users might perform with such aggregated
data. Further, neither k-anonymity nor any other confidentiality tool does
anything to cope with the implications of the release of exactly linked files
requested by “authorized users.”
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2. Much of the statistical and operations research literature on confidentiality
fails to address the risk-utility trade-off, largely by focusing primarily only
on privacy, or on technical implementations without understanding how users
wish to analyze a database; for example, see [20].
3. A clear lesson from the statistical disclosure limitation literature is that pri-
vacy protection in the form of “safe releases” from separate databases does not
guarantee privacy protection for a merged database. A figure in [28] demon-
strates recognition of this fact by showing privacy appliances applied for the
individual databases and then, again, independently for the combined data.
4. To date there have been a limited number of crosswalks between the statistical
disclosure limitation literatures on multiparty computation and risk-utility
trade-off choices for disclosure limitation. Zhong, Yang and Wright [40] provide
a starting point for discussions on k-anonymity. There are clearly a number of
alternatives to k-anonymity, and ones which yield “anonymized” databases of
far greater statistical utility!
5. The hype associated with the TIA approach to protection has abated, largely
because TIA no longer exists as an official program. But similar programs
continue to appear in different places in the federal government and no one
associated with any of them has publicly addressed the privacy concerns raised
here regarding the TIA approach.
When the U.S. Congress stopped the funding for DARPA’s TIA program in
2003, Lunt’s research and development effort at PARC Research Center was an
attendant casualty. Thus to date there have been no publicly available prototypes
of the privacy appliance, nor are there likely to be in the near future. The claims of
privacy protection and selective revelation continue with MATRIX and other data
warehouse systems, but without an attendant research program, and the federal
government continues to plan for the use of data mining techniques in other
federal initiatives such as the Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System II
(CAPPS II). Similar issues arise in the use of government, medical and private
transactional data in bio-terrorism surveillance; for example, see [17] and [32].
6. CONCLUSIONS
Data privacy protection is a major issue for e-commerce. While solutions like
SSL encryption may help companies with protection for confidential data trans-
mission, the privacy pitfalls of marketing data as part of e-commerce are many. In
this paper, we have focused on large-scale data warehousing in part because the
repeated announcements of security breaches in systems operated by the major
vendors such as Acxiom, ChoicePoint and LexusNexus have filled our morning
newspapers during the past several years. The public and civil rights groups have
argued that this is just the tip of the privacy-violation iceberg and they have
called for government intervention and legal restrictions on both public and pri-
vate organizations with respect to data warehousing and data mining. The lessons
from such privacy breaches extend easily to virtually all electronically accessible
databases. Companies need to take data security seriously and implement “best
practices,” and they need to rethink their policies on “data access” by others.
The giant data warehouses described in this paper have been assembled through
the aggregation of information from many separate databases and transactional
data systems. They depend heavily on matching and record-linkage methods that
intrinsically are statistical in nature, and whose accuracy deteriorates rapidly in
the presence of serious measurement error. Data mining tools cannot make up
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for bad data and poor matches, and someone beyond “wronged consumers” will
soon begin to pay attention.
Should you worry about these data warehouses? With very high probability
they contain data on you and your household, but you will never quite know
what data or how accurate the information is. And soon the data may be matched
into government-sponsored terrorist search systems such as the one being set up
by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to match passenger lists
into a consolidated watch list of suspected terrorists. On September 19, 2005,
the Secure Flight Working Group to the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) submitted a report questioning TSA’s secrecy regarding what data it plans
to use and how [31]:
The TSA is under a Congressional mandate to match domestic airline
passenger lists against the consolidated terrorist watch list. TSA has
failed to specify with consistency whether watch list matching is the
only goal of Secure Flight at this stage. . .
Will Secure Flight be linked to other TSA applications?. . .
How will commercial data sources be used? One of the most controver-
sial elements of Secure Flight has been the possible uses of commercial
data. TSA has never clearly defined two threshold issues: what it means
by “commercial data”; and how it might use commercial data sources
in the implementation of Secure Flight. TSA has never clearly distin-
guished among various possible uses of commercial data, which all have
different implications.
The story continues, however, since a few months later it was revealed that TSA
had purchased a database from ChoicePoint to be matched against the watch
list. (“TSA Chief Suspends Traveler Registry Plans,” Associated Press, February
9, 2006.)
Finally, we need new computational and statistical technologies to protect
linked multiple databases from privacy protection in the face of commercial and
government queries. Slogans like “selective revelation” are not enough without
technical backup. This might be provided by the serious integration of research
ideas emanating from the statistical disclosure and cryptography communities.
The technologies that result from such collaborative research must be part of the
public domain, because only then can we evaluate their adequacy.
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